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Perspectives
Dalit Experience and Theory
Do those with no lived in experience have the right to theorise? 
Analysing the elements that constitute lived in experience, this 
essay brings out the views of Gopal Guru and Habermas – two 
opposite approaches to the relation between theory and experience.
 
Sundar Sarukkai
Some years ago, Gopal Guru (2002) made some important observations about the nature of social sciences 
in India. The most important one, in my 
view, is the one about the right to theorise 
– in Guru’s terms, a moral right that is 
needed before theorising is possible. This 
is an issue that is not limited to Guru’s 
concern about the “theoretical exploitation” 
of dalits. Rather this is an issue that has 
occurred in almost all areas of discourse, 
especially in recent times. Perhaps reflect-
ing the consumer age, individuals and 
communities now want copyright and 
patent over theories about themselves or 
their communities. The most common 
way of legitimising this demand for 
copyright or for a moral right to theorise 
is by taking recourse to the notion of lived 
experience, as indeed Guru does. But what 
is lived experience? What are the elements 
that constitute lived experience? And most 
important for this copyright view of 
theory making, what is the relation between 
lived experience and theories about this 
experience? 
Who Has the Right to Theorise?
In recent times, the notions of  authority 
and authenticity have become dominant 
to the concerns of theorising. Guru’s argu-
ment that the lived experience of dalits 
constitutes the only valid and authentic 
experience, and moreover theorising this 
experience should be limited only to the 
dalits is yet another voice in this trend. 
The question that is at the foundation 
of many of these views is basically this: 
who really has the right to theorise in 
social sciences? This is a problem that 
has affected many of us, both in academics 
and outside. Consider the theorisation of 
Indian culture – its many aspects such as 
religion, society, psyche, films, music and 
so on. While there are some eminent 
theorists based in India, there are more 
who are outside India. The theories about 
the Indian experience – as experience by 
those who live in India now – are 
largely derived from “outsiders”, who, at 
the most, may visit India during breaks 
in their universities and institutes. Because 
of their position, both as competent thinkers 
and as being part of cultures which are 
connected with publishing, much of what 
is written about India and accepted by 
the world arise from such outsiders, 
whether they be of Indian origin or not. 
Unfortunately, the idea of “participant 
observation” legitimises fieldwork by 
outsiders who can sample the Indian 
experience for a few weeks in order to 
theorise about its many components. This 
can, at times, be frustrating. As much as 
it is frustrating for Guru when he sees 
non-dalits taking over the dalit experience 
in order to theorise about it. But being 
frustrated is not enough. What is important 
is to find arguments that can help us 
establish the validity or otherwise of this 
position. 
An important subtext in Guru’s article 
is the anger, sometimes justifiable, about 
non-dalits theorising dalit experience. This 
anger is common to many if not all com-
munities which exhibit a strong dislike to 
being objects of study by those who do 
not belong to that community. We rou-
tinely hear this when non-Indians make 
observations about Indian society, culture 
or its people. We routinely hear this from 
scientists when non-scientists write about 
science, especially on the problematical 
issues of science. Is this anger towards 
the outsider justifiable? Or can an out-
sider be in a position to make meaningful 
comments about a community s/he does 
not belong to? And who really is the 
outsider? 
Almost every activity has generated this 
problem. Artists have questioned critics 
of art along the same line: if you are not 
an artist yourself what gives you the 
competence – and the right – to talk about 
a piece of art? Scientists and technocrats 
have often responded to writings about 
science or technology in exactly similar 
fashion. In fact, it has become fashionable 
for scientists now to be vocal in their 
attack on philosophers or sociologists of 
science. The Nobel prize winner Weinberg 
says philosophy of science is a gloss on 
science; Hawking says something similar 
and a few years back Sokal and Bricmont 
(1998) launched a frontal attack on post-
modernists for “abusing” scientific terms. 
Technocrats often believe that philosophers 
and sociologists of technology are actu-
ally anti-technological. But the point is 
that while it is useful for philosophers of 
science to understand science, it is also 
evident that in many cases philosophy of 
science draws upon philosophy more than 
science. It uses philosophy to reflect on 
the practice and discourse of science. As 
philosophy, it is indeed an outsider to 
science. Yet, its observations on science 
are very profound and many times illu-
minate the nature of science far better 
than the practice of science does. 
Similar concerns are true of religious 
communities, where at various times the 
community members react to any writing 
about either their religion or community 
by saying that unless one believes (or 
shares a lived experience of that particu-
lar religious belief) she has no right to 
criticise that experience. Consider another 
illustrative example: vernacular language 
writers, especially after Indian English 
writing became newsworthy, have taken 
the position that Indian writers who write 
in English cannot claim to speak for the 
Indian society since a large number of 
Indians are not English speakers. Here 
language and narratives written in that 
language are inauthentic since lived ex-
perience is equated to “lived language”. 
However, there are also many human 
activities in which a theorist cannot – in 
principle – have lived experience. Should 
political theory be written only by politi-
cians? History, for instance, cannot live 
up to this demand for, according to this, 
unless a person has had lived experience 
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of an historical event, any written history 
about that event is inauthentic. We cannot 
theorise about religious fundamentalism 
unless we are part of fundamentalist or-
ganisations. And so on. When we talk 
about empathy with a suffering person 
we are able to project something of the 
other’s experience into ourselves although 
we do not in any sense have a lived 
experience of the suffering of the other. 
When we claim that untouchability is a 
crime, we do not have to have been an 
untouchable. When we ask for equality 
of citizens, including women, we do not 
have to be a woman or dalit to say that. 
That is, there are experiences which allow 
us to theorise based on other principles, 
for example, principles of human freedom 
and liberty. 
But there is a crucial difference in all 
these claims for authenticity and Guru’s 
arguments. In many of these cases the 
recourse to authenticity and lived experi-
ence comes primarily when something 
unfavourable is written about the com-
munity or experience. When an outsider 
writes what the community perceives as 
good, the outsider is not only accepted 
but also valorised. For example, the sci-
entists have rarely reacted to outsiders 
writing about the greatness of science or 
when these writers have helped in creat-
ing a legendary status to some scientists. 
It is largely when science comes under 
criticism that scientists attack non-scientists 
writing on science as not having any 
authentic experience or understanding of 
science. So also the case with writing on 
Indian culture, religion and society. When 
outsiders write about contemporary or 
ancient India in a flattering manner the 
outsider status is conveniently forgotten 
or is sometimes referred to show how 
even outsiders can recognise the greatness 
of these societies. But the moment there 
is some form of criticism the outsider 
status is invoked to debunk the criticism. 
Most often, the problem of the outsider 
status is situated within the absence of a 
lived experience. 
At the outset, it may seem that Guru is 
doing the same thing when he claims that 
non-dalits should not theorise about dalits. 
That is not really the case. Guru does not 
take the position that it is impossible for 
theorists to write about a community they 
do not belong to. As he rightly notes, that 
would involve his inability to theorise 
about non-dalits. For Guru, theory has a 
particular role to play and that role has 
to be based on experience and universal 
reason. As he suggests, the route is from 
the initial to the essential.1 But what is 
important is that this is a position he takes 
prior to any value attached to what non-
dalits write about dalit experience. That 
is, he is not interested if the writing of 
the non-dalits is complimentary or de-
rogatory about dalits. It is just that non-
dalits have no moral right to theorise about 
dalits. This is a much more stronger view 
than that discussed earlier and needs a 
critical analysis to see if it is tenable. The 
basic difference in the other view is that 
it reacts to epistemological claims about 
something, basically choosing to call 
somebody an outsider based on a judgment 
on what the outsider writes whereas 
Guru’s position is ethical and normative, 
and has no place for the theoretical out-
sider. To understand the complexity in 
these claims, we need to look more care-
fully at the notion of lived experience.
Dialectic of Choice and 
Necessity
Lived experience is a catchy term 
popular among phenomenologists. In the 
debate about experience and theory the 
notion of lived experience also plays an 
important role, as it indeed does for 
Guru’s arguments. But what exactly is the 
nature of lived experience? What makes 
lived experience unique only to the com-
munity or individual who lives it? 
Experience consists of many elements 
– the subject who experiences, the struc-
ture and content of the experience itself. 
The impetus to experience may be inter-
nal or external to the subject. Having the 
experience of burning my hand, for ex-
ample, has an external event that causes 
a particular experience in me. But one 
may also have entirely internal experi-
ences such as feeling hunger, joy or 
angst.
What does the word “lived” add to 
“experience”? Experience is often confused 
with the cause of the experience. This 
allows us to objectify the notion of ex-
perience and transport it everywhere to 
generate similar experiences, leading us 
to believe that there is a materiality to 
the whole complex of experience. This 
materiality, seen as the cause, is taken to 
be independent of the experiencer. Con-
sider this illustrative example. There are 
now restaurants whose theme is rural 
ambience. This experience, which is now 
accessible to a customer of such a restaurant, 
is presumed to be similar to the experience 
of a rural person. The kind of food, the 
earthiness of the surroundings, lack of 
what is seen as urban sophistication, etc, 
are supposed to re-create the experience 
of eating in rural places. Let us say I go 
to such a place and eat ragi balls, a staple 
rural food in Karnataka. What is it that I 
am experiencing? What is it that I am 
supposed to experience? And what is the 
relation between this experience and the 
authentic experience of a rural person who 
eats ragi balls?
The first point to note is that a naïve 
view of experience is based on the belief 
that an experience can be replicated – not 
the experience of the subject but the 
materiality that constitutes the experience, 
that which is thought to be disassociated 
from the total experience. Thus, in prin-
ciple, we usually believe that we can 
simulate all and any experience. The pos-
sibility of simulating all and any experi-
ence is based on the belief that there is 
no necessary connection between the 
experiencer and the experience. For 
example, I do not have to travel to the 
moon but I can, if I train to be an astro-
naut, get the experience of walking on 
the moon in gravitationless chambers. 
Almost any experience can be duplicated 
in some sense. Any experience that is 
commodifiable can be replicated. What 
this view of experience does is to remove 
the subject as an essential component of 
experience. All experience is similar to 
the experience of funfairs and anybody 
who pays can participate in the experience. 
Thus what is experienced is seen to be 
independent of the subject who experi-
ences. Such a view of experience influ-
ences our common beliefs about the nature 
of the experience. But can experience 
really be materialised, commodified and 
transferred without taking the subject of 
experience into account? 
Now we can understand the importance 
of the idea of lived experience. The most 
useful way to thematise lived experience 
is to recognise that there is no element 
of choice or freedom associated with it. 
In general, we find ourselves placed in a 
situation and we have to live with what 
we are given. When a rich man partakes 
the experience of the food of the poor, 
he has a choice and he is asserting that 
choice. This also implies that he has a 
choice of not participating in that experi-
ence. It is the subject’s will that decides 
on whether a particular experience is 
experienced or not. Experience of this 
kind, often referred to as vicarious 
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experience, always comes with three 
important characteristics: one, the freedom 
to be a part of an experience; two, the 
freedom  to leave any time if the experi-
ence is not satisfactory; and three, if 
necessary, to modify the experience to suit 
one’s needs.
Lived experience exhibits, in general, 
none of these three characteristics. Lived 
experience is not just about living any 
experience in the sense that we participate 
in an experience. If lived experience has 
to play an ethical and epistemological 
role, if it has to be the adjudicator of 
some notion of authenticity, then lived 
experience should be used only for those 
experiences which are seen as necessary, 
experiences over which the subject has 
no choice whether to experience it or not. 
If the experience is unpleasant there is no 
choice that allows the subject to leave or 
even modify the experience. The experi-
encer comes to the experience not as a 
subject who has some control over that 
experience but as one who will have to 
live with that experience. (This necessary 
experience may have some choice in its 
genesis – that is, I may choose to put 
myself in a situation over which I have 
no control.) All this makes lived experi-
ence qualitatively different from mere 
experience. Consider this example. I am 
bouncing around in a gravitationless room, 
simulating the experience of walking on 
the moon, and suddenly the oxygen runs 
out. As long as I have control over the 
experience, there is really no serious 
problem because I can get out of the 
simulated experience. I can go as close 
to the experience of dying and that is an 
experience that can be savoured because 
I know that at the end of it I can get out 
of the situation. Contrast this with the 
(lived) experience of the person who is 
on the moon and who doesn’t have an 
escape valve. The panic engendered in 
this person, the will to survive, the under-
standing that is generated in being in such 
a situation are indeed quite different from 
simulated experiences where there is always 
a choice to get out or modify the experi-
ence to suit our needs. In the example of 
the urban restaurant with a rural theme, 
suppose I go to eat ragi balls and I find 
that I do not like the taste. If so, I eat 
something else or go to some other res-
taurant. If the Ferris wheel is making me 
sick, I just get off it. But lived experience 
offers no such easy choice: if living your 
experience makes you feel sick, then 
too bad!
What this means is that the structure of 
lived experience is one that acknow -
ledges the essential unbreakable relation 
between the subject who experiences and 
the context and content of experience. 
This unbreakable relation is the relation 
of necessity and creates the absence of 
choice. Thus, while experience can be 
duplicated and simulated, lived experience 
cannot be opened out for experience by 
any subject. 
To take Guru’s arguments seriously, we 
have to understand lived experience in 
this manner. For his arguments to hold, 
lived experience should be seen as the 
experience of being a subject and not an 
experience by a subject or about a subject. 
That is, the first prerequisite for an expe-
rience to be considered as lived experience 
is that there is an experience of what it 
means to be the subject who experiences. 
This automatically places an element of 
no choice – there is indeed no choice in 
whether I want to be the subject of ex-
perience, although I may have choice 
about particular aspects of what I experi-
ence. You cannot have a dalit experience 
unless you are a dalit yourself or at least 
experience what it means to be a dalit 
subject with no choice to be otherwise. 
Thus, participant observation would also 
not constitute lived experience as long as 
the observer, who may otherwise live in 
and like the community, has a choice to 
leave when the going gets tough or when 
the observer decides to leave. Suppose 
we say that to be a dalit subject is to be 
oppressed with no choice of escaping this 
oppression. Then the lived experience of 
dalits is not about sharing their lifestyles, 
living with them and being like them, but 
being them in the sense that you cannot 
be anything else. Or, in other words – to 
be a dalit is not to share all that they have 
but to share that what they cannot have. 
Lived experience is not about what there 
is but is about what there is not. Lived 
experience is not about freedom of expe-
rience but about the lack of freedom in 
an experience.
It is this sense of lived experience that 
allows us to understand why lived 
experience is in fact factored into an 
essential ethical principle that expects the 
experiencer to become the subject of 
experience. But Guru goes a step further. 
He wants lived experience to justify an 
ethical principle to do theory. That means 
that it is not enough to use lived experi-
ence as a validation but it is asked to do 
more, to become the ground for social 
theory. Can it live up to what Guru 
demands of it?
Guru’s notion of lived experience as 
essentially related to theory is only one 
part of the theoretical element of an ex-
perience. This is the experience of being 
a subject and not experience about the 
subject. Being a subject is one part of the 
experience, an essential part no doubt but 
it does not encompass the complete ex-
perience. If one follows Guru’s prescrip-
tions, then we will have to acknowledge 
the possibility of expanding what we 
define as theory and knowledge. If lived 
experience is to be final validation for 
theory then we will have to look at auto-
biographies as epistemologically legitimate 
in a fundamental sense. Interestingly, this 
is a view that has been expounded in the 
pages of EPW some years ago by 
M N Srinivas (1996). He believed that 
auto biography could be a legitimate tool 
to understand societies. His argument is 
based on the idea of learning to trust 
subjective experience and subjective des-
cription as being true to the subject who 
has experienced it or who speaks it. We 
can extend this argument further, as I had 
indeed done, to claim that fiction based 
on lived experiences should actually be 
seen as a legitimate mode of theorising 
[Sarukkai 1997:1406-09]. But this mode 
of autobiography or fiction runs counter 
to the traditional, modernist view that 
depends on the empirical-theoretical di-
chotomy to generate objective knowledge. 
If Guru wants to hold onto this structure 
of empirical and theoretical then he should 
reconsider his emphasis on lived experi-
ence. Or if he wants to place lived expe-
rience at the centre then he should 
modify his view of theories, especially 
his understanding of the empirical. One 
of the ways of doing this is to demand 
that ethics be integral to the act of theo-
rising – if so, then lived experience becomes 
the ground for such ethical intertwinement 
with theory. 
  
Theory and Experience: 
Ownership or Authorship?
One way to distinguish the nature of 
experience and theoretical reflection about 
that experience is through the notion of 
authority. Is an individual an author of 
her experience? What is the relation of 
authorship between an individual and the 
theory she constructs? 
Authorship is an important criterion in 
distinguishing experience and theory. 
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A person who experiences is not an author 
of that experience like a person who 
theorises about that experience. We are 
not authors of our experience in the sense 
that we do not create that experience 
within us. It is part of our nature to have 
such experiences and there is no extra 
agency needed to initiate such a feeling 
within us. The experiences that we have 
can be broadly classified into two types: 
one arising from being in situations not 
of our making and the other arising from 
situations we consciously put ourselves 
in. For example, the experience of being 
a dalit belongs to the former type and 
experiencing the feeling of being drunk 
may be a consequence of a conscious act. 
In the first case we are definitely not 
authors in any sense. We are neither 
authors of the events in which we find 
ourselves in nor authors of the experience 
that is caused by such events. But it could 
be argued that we are authors of our ex-
perience in the second type: we simulate  the 
experience of being drunk because indivi-
duals choose to drink in order to have that 
experience. However, even in such cases, 
we are not necessarily authors of our 
experience although we may be “authors”  of 
that which causes certain experiences, such 
as being the agent who decides to drink. 
If we are not authors of our experi-
ences then how are we related to our own 
experiences? We are related to our expe-
riences as owners – we own our experi-
ences but do not author them. It is perhaps 
similar to the way we own books which 
we do not author. Ownership confers a 
set of rights over what we own and author-
ship confers a different set of rights over 
what we author. In the historical trajec-
tory of these ideas, we can see a sense of 
private and public playing out in these 
terms. (Authors have copyrights and own-
ers have certain other rights.) For the 
purpose of the discussion related to  the  rights 
of theorising our experiences, I suggest 
that it is the dichotomy of ownership and 
authorship that is most illuminating. 
Once we make this move, Guru’s claim 
can be rephrased in the following manner: 
an owner has a stake as an author. The 
extreme case of claiming that only those 
who experience can theorise implies only 
an owner can be an author. Is this a ten-
able position?
To understand this, we need to look at 
the notion of the owner in greater detail. 
What does an owner actually own? The 
owner of a book owns something of that 
book – in this case, only the materiality 
of a particular book. The owner has no 
rights over that book. She cannot print it 
and distribute it, for example. She cannot, 
in principle, change a few lines here and 
there and publish it as her own. Actually, 
there is very little an owner can do with 
a book other than buy it and perhaps read 
it! The owner owns that particular book 
meaning thereby there are specific acts 
that are allowed under that ownership – 
for example, getting rid of it if she does 
not like that book. Experience is like this: 
we own our experience meaning thereby 
that there is only little we have control 
of in that experience. Most often we do 
not have control over what causes that 
experience; we do not have any say in 
how the experience should be; we have 
nothing at all to add consciously to that 
experience, that is, we cannot either delete 
unpleasant elements or add pleasant 
elements to a given experience. 
Here is why experience enters into a 
problematical relation with theory. To 
theorise is to have a say, it is to be able 
to say. To theorise about a particular 
experience is to have a say about that 
experience. And who can really have a 
say in having a say about an experience? 
Guru’s position would mean that it is the 
owner who has the final say in saying 
anything about that experience. However, 
we can only partially accept this view 
because there are many elements of that 
experience which the owner is not really 
an owner of. We own our experience only 
in a particular meaning of that term and 
we may have control over only some 
elements of that experience.
Ethics of Theorising
 
In principle, we can theorise about 
another person’s experience because there 
is a space within that experience which 
is not related to the experiencer. For 
example, consider the element of oppres-
sion which a dalit experiences. The dalit 
who experiences oppression legitimately 
owns that experience of oppression. How-
ever the experience of oppression also 
involves an oppressor, either as an indi-
vidual or a system, and the dalit has no 
control or ownership over this oppressor. 
So, how much of the experience of op-
pression can be owned by a dalit who 
experiences oppression in a particular act? 
Moreover, does a person who experi-
ences oppression own that particular ex-
perience or larger categories that describe 
that experience? Is there a difference 
between a person who experiences 
oppression once as against somebody who 
experiences it repeatedly? Who has a 
greater ownership claim to the idea of 
oppression?
This question is relevant because 
theory does this job of moving away from 
the particular. One’s experience may not 
be enough to validate our right to have a 
say about the conceptual world which de-
scribes that experience. On the other hand, 
not having any experience but theorising 
about it also seems intrinsically problem-
atical. It is this tension about theorising 
that is manifested in two radically different 
approaches by two thinkers. At one end, 
we have Gopal Guru and his argument that 
only the people who own an experience 
can theorise about it. At the other end, we 
have Habermas whose theoretical impulse 
arises in response to an experience but does 
not expect the theoreti cian to have anything 
to do with the experience. 
There are different ways of understand-
ing these opposites. One such way is 
through the binary of emotion and reason. 
Experience is often placed under the idea 
of emotion and related terms whereas 
theory is something that arises under the 
action of reason. To hold Habermas’ 
position is to give into this absolute 
dichotomy between emotion and reason 
or experience and reason. There are many 
pointers to why such a dichotomy seems 
to make apparent sense. Experience is 
first person; reason overcomes individual 
capacity. Experience is local specific and 
context specific. Reason attempts to es-
tablish the universal present in local 
specificities. But these two terms also 
share similarities. Both of them seem to 
be outside wilful and conscious behaviour 
of individuals. We have experiences just 
as we have reason. We make mistakes 
about deploying both our reason and our 
experience but the fact is that we have 
an innate capacity for both. 
Guru’s position, in contrast to Habermas, 
is to merge this distinction and construct 
an essential relation between them. Ask-
ing for theory to be essentially related to 
experience is asking for reason to be essen-
tially yoked to feeling, emotions and such 
terms. This yoking is not at the level of 
legitimacy; that is, Guru is not claiming that 
it is epistemologically ille gitimate to not 
relate reason to emotion. He would like to 
claim that experience and reason are in 
some sense ontologically related; that is,  they 
are related as facts of the matter. That is 
the reason why he finds an ethical component 
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in this relation – it is ethically wrong to 
theorise about experience when one has 
not experienced the same oneself. 
The Habermasian approach is actually 
one that tells us what the role of theory is. 
In phrasing his approach in this manner, 
we can see a clear distinction between what 
he does and Guru’s demands on theory. 
Habermas’ approach should be seen against 
the background of his support for moder-
nity in general. It should also be placed 
against a historical trajectory and in par-
ticular to his response to German fascism. 
Theory as Distributing Guilt
The German role in the second world 
war (and related horrific consequences 
such as the Holocaust) has inspired im-
portant theories. To give two well known 
examples, particularly of relevance to this 
paper, consider the responses to this event 
by two thinkers, Habermas and Levinas. 
One of the influential ideas inspired by 
Habermas is that of the public sphere. 
The idea of public sphere has been so 
much appropriated that in a seminar on  the 
public sphere there were attempts to use 
Habermas to make sense of how ordinary 
people watch Hindi movies in Mumbai! 
Whether these ideas can be universalised 
as easily as some do is another question 
altogether. The point that interests me is 
how is it that we come to believe – most 
times very effortlessly – that categories 
defining another society, another experi-
ential space, are easily appropriated to 
describe a different set of experiences. 
One obvious way is through the action 
of universality of concepts that become 
part of social theory. The use of such 
concepts seemingly transcends particular 
societies and cultures. 
This idea of universality is indeed 
strongly present in Habermas’ theorisation 
of the public sphere and principles of 
communicative praxis. Habermas’ support 
for the larger project of modernity is in 
consonance with specific ideas related to 
his theorisation of the public sphere. He 
is also responding to his and his country’s 
historical journey and engagement with 
fascism. Shocked at the depravity of the 
Nazi period, Habermas wants to find a 
theoretical way to engage with what hap-
pened. Engaging theoretically also means 
a way of absolving oneself from the sin 
of somehow even being related to these 
atrocities. Rational communication is 
potentially one way to stop such acts from 
happening. 
Pensky (1995) notes that the historical 
trajectory of the German land including 
the pre-war era, dominance in middle 
Europe, the Nazi years, partition and 
reunification – all these define the relation 
of the universal and particular in Haber-
mas. Given this historical experience, the 
only way out for Germany was to be a 
democratic society with liberal principles 
and it is these principles that Habermas 
wants to universalise. 
Universalism for Habermas is a col-
lectively shared mentality, “a sense of 
solidarity inhabiting a public space that 
is distinct from political or economic 
institutions” [Pensky 1995: 69]. Pensky 
understands mentality as referring to a 
“mode of conduct with its accompanying 
capacities for self-deliberation, for self-
examination and self-criticism” (ibid: 71). 
Although distinguished from the particular 
forms of life it has to be rooted in some 
such culture. For Habermas the real force 
of universalism is in the moral domain, 
manifested, for example, as plurality and 
the response to a different other. Habermas’ 
writing on the nature of German state, its 
relation with the past, its problems after 
reunification all point to his attempts to 
construct a philosophy that is essentially 
beholden to the German experience. 
However, remember that Habermas’ 
concerns are nothing new; they are part 
of the articulations of a collective German 
guilt. Karl Jaspers already wrote this in 
1945 – “Germany cannot come to [regain 
consciousness] unless we Germans find 
the way to communicate with each other… 
we want to learn to talk to each other… 
we do not just want to assert but to reflect 
connectedly, listen to reasons, remain 
prepared for a new insight” (ibid: 90). 
Strong and Sposito (1995) argue this 
case of an indebtedness of theories to 
their social origins much more strongly. 
They begin by noting that “the theory of 
communicative action makes the case that 
rationality is a relevant moral social con-
cept” (ibid: 263). Speaking to each other 
places us in a moral position. The authors 
point out that Habermas believes that the 
resources needed for the “ethicopolitical 
democratic” project are available in the 
Anglo-American and European traditions. 
Habermas tries to rehabilitate western 
thought not as western thought alone but 
as something universal. The specific 
western thought that he privileges is that 
associated with the Enlightenment. Uni-
versalisation displaces Enlightenment 
thought from its specific European origin 
and becomes a model for other cultures 
and societies displaced both spatially and 
temporally from Europe. 
But why is it important to preserve and 
continue Enlightenment? Strong and 
Sposito (1995) suggest that it is largely 
because of the politics of Europe, which 
included the specific German experience 
with fascism. The authors note that although 
the early Habermas does not view even 
a thinker like Nietzche as dangerous, in 
later works he attacks Nietzsche, Derrida 
and Heidegger as being “politically danger-
ous” (ibid: 264). An important reason for 
such a shift is the growth of neo-Nazism 
in Germany. His attack on the post-moderns 
is fuelled by his reaction to the Nazi rule. 
The Nazi experience “makes it not only 
possible but necessary to think in univer-
salist terms” (ibid: 266). Thus, for Hab-
ermas, the fact of Nazism means that we 
“must think in universalistic ethicopolitical 
terms as long as we remember the fact of 
Nazism” (ibid: 266). Habermas writes in 
terms of the “we” and “our” but who is 
this we? Strong and Sposito suggest that in 
the use of the “we” Habermas is suggesting 
that “because of their historical experiences 
Germans now carry the world historical 
burden of the universal” (ibid: 267). 
What is the relation of theorising and 
the creation of such universalities to the 
specific German experience? Under what 
conditions can those in a different soci-
ety accept such universal categories which 
arise from specific experiences? What ex-
actly is Habermas doing in creating theories 
as response to certain social events?
I suggest that what he is doing is using 
theory as an agent to distribute guilt. 
Theory does this very effectively in many 
ways: depersonalising traumatic events, 
creating new categories to place these 
events in, creating explanatory structures 
as part of its structure, abstracting concepts 
and ideas that then simulate universality 
and so on. Habermas could have re-
sponded to the Nazi experience in many 
different ways but as far as he uses the-
ory to respond to it he is deploying 
theory for a particular purpose, that of 
distributing his guilt among others. His 
guilt is phrased in terms such as abhor-
rence of the Nazi experience, fear that 
neo-Nazism is rising and so on but in 
effect theory, in the way he construes it, 
functions as a distributor of guilt. Just as 
much as the Germans “now carry the 
world historical burden of the universal” 
it is theory that carries the guilt of inhuman 
acts of a culture. When others participate 
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in such a theory they dilute individual 
sense of guilt for those somehow associated 
to a guilt-inducing action; universali sation 
is the ultimate dilution of guilt. 
There is a precondition for theory to 
do this job – establishing the distance 
between theory and experience. Habermas’ 
support to modernity or his thematisation 
of the public sphere with its concomitant 
ideas of rational communicative praxis 
are not theoretical moves that arise from 
lived experience as formulated by Guru. 
In fact, the crucial point here is that 
experience cannot dictate authorship. 
Habermas’ theory is for us – namely, those 
who have not participated in that experience. 
It is we, who are outside this experi ence in 
all sorts of ways, who can build upon this 
theorisation. It is we, as com plete outsiders 
to this experience, who will carry on and 
pass on this universal guilt – that is, it is 
we as outsiders who will theorise about this 
experience which is receding further and 
farther away from   us. 
For Habermas then theory is legiti-
mated by its distance from experience. 
If he accepts Guru’s position, then he 
would have to say that only those who 
have suffered under the Nazi rule should 
theorise about it. So both Guru and Hab-
ermas stand for two opposite views in 
their approach to the relation between 
theory and experience. However, Haber-
mas’ approach can be usefully contrasted 
with the Levinasian attempt to theorise 
about the Holocaust. Levinas’ theory arises 
from lived experience; a lived experience 
of Nazism which he and his family had to 
endure. His construction of an ethical 
theory is directly mediated not just by an 
experience but by a lived experience in 
which the idea of necessity (as described 
earlier) is strongly encoded. Guru’s approach 
to theorising about the dalits is a Levinasian 
approach in contrast to a Habermasian 
one. For both Levinas and Gopal Guru, 
guilt is not to be distributed and shared 
among non-experiencers through the guise 
of theory. Theory is to be felt, is to embody 
suffering and pain, is to relate the episte-
mological with the emotional, that is, is 
to bring together reason and emotion. That 
is really the challenge that Guru forces on 
the practice of social science in India.
Email: sarukkai@nias.iisc.ernet.in
Note
[I am grateful to Gopal Guru for his critical 
response to this paper. Thoughtful feedback  from 
Dhanwanti Nayak was of great help.]
1 Personal communication.
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